Homeland Security and Intelligence: Can Oil Mix with Water in an Open Society? by William C. Spracher Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement 11(1):29-54, Spring 2004. Abstract: The newest US Cabinet department is Homeland Security (DHS). One of the most controversial aspects in the process of developing this entity is the role of intelligence in providing information on the increasing terrorist threat. This article examines the intelligence challenges for homeland security. In doing so, it explores the problems of merging disparate cultures - law enforcement vs intelligence, civil entities vs. military, federal vs. state and local jurisdictions, and domestic focus vs international perspective. Given the nature of the globalized, asymmetric threat, the need for more and better intelligence sharing ins obvious. Terrorists and other criminals do not respect international boundaries; in fact, they exploit them in an effort to prevent effective and timely countermeasures. This demands that robust multinational collaboration and interagency coordination be practiced. Introduction ... Controversies ... (80% of p.49) A final topic that generated a firestorm of controversy a few months ago but now seems to be dead is DOD's proposed Total Information Awareness (TIA) program. This was essentially a terrorism `database mining' effort designed by the Defense Advanced Projects Agency (DARPA), which would allow analysts to sift through vast amounts of banking, medical, credit card, travel and other personal information to look for patterns suggesting terrorist activity. Although Pentagon officials tried to reassure critics that the program would be tightly controlled and that safeguards would protect the privacy rights of US citizens, opposition continued to grow and finally the Senate voted unanimously to cut off funding for the program. This was after a feeble effort by DOD supporters to soften the public image of TIA by renaming it the Terrorism Information Awareness Program. the Senate's vote was hailed by civil rights groups, which condemn the TIA concept as an invation of privacy. Interestingly, the same individual who was pushing TIA, retired Navy Vice Admiral John Poindexter, also created the highly outrageous scheme known as Policy Analysis Market (PAM), which was intended to help military authorities predict terrorist action by carefully scrutinizing investor information and analyses. Harsh reaction was immediate from all sides, with critics expressing disbelief that a White House professing ethical values would condone what essentially would be a future market that encouraged gambling on people's lives. Poindexter, infamous as President Reagan's national security advisor during the Iran-Contra scandal of the late 1980s, has since resigned his DOD post and it is assumed that neither PAM nor TIA will ever see the light of day. In the minds of the harshest critics, the fact that these questionable programs were even suggested casts doubts about the wisdom of Bush administration officials and contributes to the public relations problems of a White House considered by many as too intrusive and prone to secrecy. Such programs also give a bad name to legitimate intelligence activities that are invaluable for protecting the homeland from the threat of terrorism. TIA certainly had potentially serious civil liberties problems. Nevertheless, though this author had doubts about the utility of PAM, the shrill hue and cry over such DARPA efforts is unfounded. Indeed, these are precisely the kinds of unorthodox experimental programs that DARPA was created to conceive in the first place. DARPA is supposed to `think outside the box'. Perhaps PAM was too far outside the box, since it produced a public relations disaster for the Pentagon. Conclusions and Recommendations ...