The Scientist, Dec 15, 2003 v17 i24 p6(1) 
Did he just get the year wrong? (Editorial) Richard Gallagher. 


I was dreamin' when I wrote this, forgive me if it goes astray But when I 
woke up this mornin', could've sworn it was Judgment Day The sky was all 
purple, there were people runnin' everywhere Tryin' 2 run from the 
destruction, U know I didn't even care Cuz they say 2000 zero zero party 
over, oops, out of time! So 2night I'm gonna party like it's 1999! 

--"1999" Prince 

Looking back over 2003, we could easily find ourselves sliding into 
preholiday heavyheartedness. Considering the ongoing plundering of the 
planet; the debut of new, globally mobile infectious diseases; the tenacity 
of the older infectious diseases; the ingress of invasive species; the 
threat of genetically modified crops; the dehumanizing issue of cloning; the 
alarming weather extremes; and the immediate, worldwide threat of terrorism. 
One might wonder if pop star Prince just got the year wrong. 

Each of these exigencies is, to an extent, a biological issue that should 
matter to biologists. It also should make life scientists realize the need 
to become much more familiar with various areas of risk: risk assessment, 
risk management, and risk communication. 

Take an example from terrorism. The RAND Corporation has developed a number 
of scenarios for unconventional terrorist attacks. (1) One involves the 
aerial release of 50 kilograms of aerosolized anthrax over a medium-sized 
city. Under favorable weather conditions, the spores would spread over 300 
square kilometers, potentially exposing 500,000 people and infecting about 
300,000. The city would have to be sealed off, possibly for decades. In an 
instant, a ghost city would be created; the worldwide emotional and economic 
impact would be seismic. 

But how likely is it that the bacteria could be cultured, formulated, 
transported and released? And to what extent might the research community 
control this and similar plots by self-policing of research and publication, 
as is currently being discussed? Or, indeed, is unconstrained research and 
communication essential to developing countermeasures to prevent attacks? 

Opinions abound, often contradictory. My question: Could risk analysis help 
provide plausible answers? Do data-gathering techniques and analysis tools 
exist that should be applied, but aren't? 

One relatively simple approach that caught the public imagination (and 
reprobation) uses a "futures market" to help predict political upheaval in 
the Middle East. Events such as the overthrow of a monarch are treated as if 
they were stocks: The higher the price on a particular incident, the more 
likely it would occur. This Policy Analysis Market (PAM) is due to be 
launched in March 2004. The PAM may not fall within the academic discipline 
of risk analysis, but it is a tool with a strong history of accurately 
predicting future events. Could a version be set up to assess bioterrorism, 
with biologists playing the role of traders? (2) 

Science did score a major success this year in risk assessment: SARS. Here, 
we did not so much dodge a bullet but rather assessed and neutralized the 
possible impact of said bullet, combining outstanding science with a 
coordinated international response. If only the overwhelming scientific 
evidence for global warming would bring the same swift response from 
politicians of all countries. 

Still, we cannot solve these problems over the holiday season. So for now, 
let us put such matters to one side and indulge in our own personal risk 
assessment: Too much food? An excess of drink? Skating on thin ice, 
figuratively, and (with global warming) literally? Enjoy! 

References 

1. L.E. Davis et al., "Individual preparedness and response to chemical, 
radiological, nuclear, and biological terrorist attacks," RAND, available 
online at www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1731 

2. www.policyanalysismarket.com 

Richard Gallagher, Editor (rgallagher@the-scientist.com)