Richard A. Rettig, Reorganizing The National Institutes Of Health, Health Affairs 23(1):357-262, January/February, 2004. Special Report Reorganizing The National Institutes Of Health A review of an important National Research Council–Institute of Medicine report to revitalize the NIH. by Richard A. Rettig ABSTRACT: A committee of the National Research Council and the Institute of Medicine recently released a report on reorganizing the National Institutes of Health (NIH). This report responds to a request by Congress in connection with the fiscal year 2001 budget for the NIH. The report contains some pragmatic proposals, avoids postulating an ideal NIH but does propose a radical new “special programs office” that would function as does the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and advocates that clinical research be strengthened. ... Conservatism And Boldness Underlying the committee’s concern is the inherent conservatism that is embedded in the existing NIH structure. The report calls for boldness in several ways. Congress is asked to charge the director “to lead a trans-NIH planning process to identify major crosscutting issues and their associated research and training opportunities” (no. 4). The report also recommends that the intramural research program take risks and be innovative” (no. 8). Perhaps the most breathtaking recommendation to this reviewer is that a director’s special projects program be created, fashioned after the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) (no. 7). (The report was publicly released July 29, just as DARPA’s terrorism futures market was being eliminated in response to scathing political criticism.)18 In the committee’s view, Congress should fund this program initially at $100 million, be prepared to have that amount grow to $1 billion annually, and commit to supporting it for eight to ten years “so that a sufficient number of projects can reach fruition and a full assessment of program efforts can be made.”19 The high-risk, high-reward DARPA approach is weakly supported by examples of DARPA-like opportunities that confront the NIH. The argument that a special initiatives program would work, or work well enough to sustain scientific and political support, is highly speculative and rests on a corporate model that might be inappropriate. The DARPA strategy involves both supporting leading-edge research and carrying that through to application in a “research, development, test, and evaluation” process wholly owned by the Department of Defense (DOD). It is based on the “common defense” clause of the Constitution, which grants the DOD a virtual monopoly in national security matters. The NIH, which flies under the public health and general welfare clauses of the Constitution, does not own the entire process from bio-medical research to application in clinical practice. The issue, therefore, of who defines defense needs for DARPA raises the question of who might define health research needs for the NIH. (Back to mission we go.) Moreover, DARPA is largely sheltered from public view, whereas any special programs office in the NIH will exist in a domestic fishbowl and be scrutinized by the scientific community, clinical medicine, and disease-oriented advocates, to say nothing of the working press. ...