Extropy 6(1):32-36, 1994 published edited comments, including mine, from a discussion on the Extropians email list, under the title "Nanarchy" I do not have a copy of that article anymore. Here is the discussion that article was drawn from, except that many text bodies that I did not have permission to foward are deleted. Sorry, that's the best I can do for now. Robin Hanson
From: Extropians@extropy.org
Reply-To: extropians@extropy.org
To: Extropians@extropy.org
Message-Id: <199308310136.AA17823@news.panix.com>
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 1993 21:36:30 -0400
Subject: WAR/NANO/LAW: Against Nanarchy
X-Extropian-Date: August 31, 373 P.N.O. [01:36:19 UTC]
Errors-To: Extropians-Request@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Extropians Digest Tue, 31 Aug 93 Volume 93 : Issue 242
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 15:01:32 PDT
From: Robin Hanson
Subject: WAR/NANO/LAW: Against Nanarchy
Derek Zahn suggests:
>I hope we can have a debate about "nanarchy".
OK, I'm ready to debate (my Extropy arrived Friday), and offer to take the
CON side. Will any worthy opponent take the PRO side? I will now respond
to Mark Miller's discussion in the Extropy interview, but to go beyond
that, we'll need a proponent. (This idea has been published no where else,
to my knowledge).
First let me summarize Mark's case.
------------------- SUMMARY OF PRO ARGUMENT ----------------------------
Mark offers nanarchy as an alternative to anarchy and minarchy, and as a
solution to 3 problems.
The first problem is that anarchy "relies on the ability to use coercion",
and while its answer to the question "who will watch the watchers" is
self-consistent, "the paradox is that" it requires "the proper activities
of those users of force" in order to "turn market forces in on the users of
force. (I think he means to say that there are other semi-stable
situations besides anarchy, and so an anarchy might evolve to something
else, and other arrangements need not evolve to anarchy.)
Second, Mark thinks that "post-enforcement depends on punishment creating
an incentive not to commit a crime, and that gets trashed by
post-Singularity confusions of identity" revealed by considering "If you
create an AI, and it goes out and kills somebody; are you responsible?" and
that "the whole process of thinking about agoric systems made clear that
you want to assign rights to lots of little things". So instead we need
"pre-enforcement" where "when the coercion is attempted, it is prevented".
The third problem Mark wants to address is that:
"In the absence of ... nanarchy ... if you go with the homestead model, and
in the presence of the possibility soon of self-replicating, space-faring
machines that are able to arrange for their own military defense and able
to use the resources that they're acquiring by spreading to engage in that
defense, what results is a terrible winner-take-all race ... whoever gets
there first takes the entire universe, and the rest of us are left with
essentially nothing. Alternatively, ...you might end up with .. a very
extreme oligarchy, and it's also not necessarily stable because of the
logic of military power in a system where whoever expands fastest or
expands in the direction of more available mass-energy, gets to have more
mass-energy at his disposal to beat on the other guys. There's a positive
feedback in there that probably still ends up with one winner taking all.
To solve these problems, Mark proposes "central planning and central
authority". Some unspecified power ensures that "the first wave that
explodes out there into the universe be the minimum framework of enforced
rules such that ... that kind of military instability cannot happen"
They create, and then relinquish control over, "a dispersed system of
communicating nano-Gorts" which is "monitoring for certain inter-boundary
activities that may be coercive, and stops any that fall within the
possibility of coercion", the boundaries being those determined by some
"initial division of property" in the whole universe. Some set of mutual
funds would be created, every person alive on "inheritance day" would get
an equal share in each fund, with trade in shares then allowed.
Mark sees the central design problem as how to "engineer ... a mutually
constraining development process for designing a secure mechanism ... such
that ... we can be confident that the system as a whole does not have any
trapdoors in it". And Mark wants to find a minimal kernel, with "minimal
set of constraints, on top of which we can bootstrap a system of
enforcement mechanisms that are capable of enforcing such a system of
property rights." This is "extremely difficult", but "cryptographic
techniques as well as the progress on program proving ... give me hope
that we could actually carry this thing out".
---------------------- My CON Arguments -----------------------------
First let me respond to specific points, and then I will comment more
generally.
Post-enforcement is not "trashed" by AIs and upload copies. One viable
alternative is to (except for human biological children), always hold
"parents" always retains responsibility for the "children"; if parents
can't be found then siblings take their place. Parents might sell this
obligation to an insurance company, but if that company goes bust, they are
responsible.
The risk that any anarchy we might create now could evolve into something
else, and then evolve again, must be weighed against the risk that any
"permanent" solution may turn out to be terribly wrong. Unless the
permananent solution is clearly better than the "average" expected future
political regimes, risk averse folks should prefer the mixture.
If we are considering whether to offer our political support to some
growing "movement" in favor of nanarchy, we must consider the possibility
that this movement will get out of hand, implementing something that looks
to most people like nanarchy, but not to us.
If this nanarchy must be designed and implemented, and a global political
consensus formed in its favor, all before the first wave of intersellar
colonization, there is likely not enough time left.
If technology continues to improve, it's not clear how a nanarchy built on
old technology could prevent more advanced attempts at "coercion". If
technological improvement must "run out" before nanarchy, then this seems
unlikely before the first intersellar colonization.
A nanarchy trying to implement tradable universe shares would have to be
able to tell who was the "rightful" owner of some shares. If these rights
could be split arbitrarily, the task of the nano-Gorts in detecting and
preventing all violations could quickly become impossible. So nanarchy
would have to be limited to enforcing some limited and clear concept of
"coercion", and I'm not sure there is a natural choice here.
Now let's get to the central point. Mark clearly thinks that colonization
of the universe naturally leads to a single military power, and this seems
the primary reason to create a single power now, and "do it right".
However, this central point is not so much poorly defended as hardly
defended at all. Sure, "whoever expands fastest ... gets to have more
mass-energy at his disposal to beat on the other guys". But the same could
be said of ordinary economic growth, yet few argue this implies a single
power.
The question is: why would a power controlling more mass tend to grow at a
faster percentage rate, or find it in their interest to wage war? I would
actually be most convinced by a board game, plausibly modeling the
colonization process, where I could play and see that a single power was
the natural result.
If at least one of the largest expanding powers were "open", allowing us
all to buy shares in it, or to immigrate into it, then there is little risk
that the universe will be shut off from us.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mark says he developed most of these ideas with Eric Drexler years ago, but
only now does he have "a community to say these things to." But they need
not only to talk, but also to listen. I encourage one or both of them to
now submit their ideas, in detail, for critical scrutiny by a larger
community.
Robin Hanson hanson@ptolemy.arc.nasa.gov
415-604-3361 MS-269-2, NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA 94035
510-651-7483 47164 Male Terrace, Fremont, CA 94539-7921
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 1993 15:48:57 -0700
From: dkrieger@Synopsys.COM (Dave Krieger)
Subject: Important! Please read using ::resend.
From: Robin Hanson
To: dkrieger@Synopsys.COM
Cc: hanson
Message-Id: <9308312005.AA00247@ptolemy.arc.nasa.gov>
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 93 13:05:58 PDT
Subject: WAR/NANO/LAW: Against Nanarchy
>If you participate in the discussion, please indicate explicitly in
>your posts whether or not re-publication of your remarks is OK.
You may republish all posts of mine on this thread. Robin Hanson
From: Robin Hanson
To: extropians@extropy.org
Cc: hanson
Message-Id: <9308312041.AA00740@ptolemy.arc.nasa.gov>
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 93 13:41:06 PDT
Subject: AIT:Socialist computation
In-Reply-To: <199308310746.AA24532@news.panix.com>
This complexity argument against central planning picks too easy a
target. Sure a central planning board couldn't hope to decide when
everyone eats lunch and goes to bed, and whether your curtains should
be blue or white. No one argues they should plan *everything*.
The harder target to argue against is the idea that central planners
could be well enough "calibrated" to know when they know enough to
intervene, and when they don't know enough, and so should back off and
leave things alone. I don't think such calibration is impossible; my
criticism would focus instead on the concept of these planners as
neutral altruists, seeking only what is best for us.
Remember the thread here on whether we could make trustworthy AI
slaves? A related question is whether we could make a good AI king.
Imagine we created an AI, optimized not so much to be really smart,
but to be well-calibrated, to understand to the concept economic
efficiency, and to have such efficiency as a goal. Then imagine
giving it absolute power over us.
The best arguments against such an AI king, to my mind, would question
our ability to supervise the construction of an AI we all accept as
neutrally calibrated, and the risk that someone/thing else will take
over this supposed "abolute" power.
Robin Hanson
Date: Wed, 1 Sep 1993 12:41:11 -0400
From: tburns@gmuvax.gmu.edu (T. David Burns)
Subject: AIT:Socialist computation
>From: Robin Hanson
To: extropians@extropy.org
Cc: hanson
Message-Id: <9309012032.AA08622@ptolemy.arc.nasa.gov>
Date: Wed, 1 Sep 93 13:32:52 PDT
Subject: AIT:Socialist computation
T. David Burns writes:
>> planning board ... No one argues they should plan *everything*.
>That's not what is being argued. ... In full socialism, there is
>nothing to intervene into. Since no one owns any productive property,
>all production decisions are ultimately up to the planners. They can
>routinize or delegate decisions [but not] intervening in an
>independent process.
Perhaps I have misused the word "socialism". Then again, I worry you
have set up a strawman to attack - is "capitalism" where no central
organizations make any decisions, such as for national defense?
In any case, most real "socialist" folks in the world promote more,
rather than less, intervention in "market" processes. These folks
imagine they can tell when to intervene and when to leave things
alone. And they all want to leave some things alone.
>Why not just make its decisions advisory, with nice democratic
>institutions mediating between the plan and human rights?
Under almost any institution almost anyone can "advise". The core of
the institution determines who has what power.
Robin Hanson
From: Extropians@extropy.org
Reply-To: extropians@extropy.org
To: Extropians@extropy.org
Message-Id: <199309011930.AA02014@news.panix.com>
Date: Wed, 1 Sep 1993 15:30:54 -0400
Subject: Extropians Digest
X-Extropian-Date: September 1, 373 P.N.O. [19:30:38 UTC]
Errors-To: Extropians-Request@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Extropians Digest Wed, 1 Sep 93 Volume 93 : Issue 243
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 93 22:46:07 PDT
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Subject: WAR/NANO/LAW: Against Nanarchy
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 1 Sep 93 0:03:23 PDT
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Subject: WAR/NANO/LAW: Against Nanarchy
>From: Robin Hanson
To: extropians@extropy.org
Cc: hanson, szabo@netcom.com, hfinney@shell.portal.com
Message-Id: <9309012112.AA08947@ptolemy.arc.nasa.gov>
Date: Wed, 1 Sep 93 14:12:41 PDT
Subject: WAR/NANO/LAW: Against Nanarchy
In-Reply-To: <199309011930.AA02014@news.panix.com>
I proposed that "a viable alternative" to nanarchy is to always hold
"parents" responsible for their "children" "(except for human
biological children)".
Hal Finney responds:
>why in this alternative would one except humans?
Just as a grandfather clause, because we're used to this, and it doesn't
fail terribly.
>I don't think it makes sense to hold human "parents" always responsible
>for the actions of their AI "children". ... If you created the AI twenty
>years ago and it has been living on its own all this time
I didn't say it would be optimal, just "viable". (Though given scenarios
like those sketched by Nick Szabo, my proposal may well be optimal.)
Crime could be deterred at an acceptable cost. Nanarchy is not *required*
to deal with future crime.
>We might even say that nanarchy is DEFINED to be a stable, self-enforcing
>political system which provides minimal guarantees against coercion.
We might define socialism as successful central planning too. But it is
fairer to define nanarchy as a centralized *attempt* to stop coercion, an
attempt that could also go terribly wrong (system prevents anyone touching
anyone else, system taken over by despots, etc.)
>> Mark clearly thinks that colonization of the universe naturally leads to
>> a single military power ... Sure, "whoever expands fastest ... gets to
>> have more mass-energy ...". But the same could be said of ordinary
>> economic growth, yet few argue this implies a single power.
>
>I do believe that this could easily occur ... nanotech self-reproducing
>machines could expand from star system to star system. the first seeds to
>enter a system ... would end up with full possession of ... that system.
>They would then be in a position to expand outward all the faster. You
>would have an initial wave of exponential growth (which would settle down
>to third-power growth) and in such a framework an initial head start could
>become a numerically overwhelming advantage. ... I think the initial
>exponential growth phase, when all that is going on is claim-staking and
>colonization, is going to allow only a very small number of competitors.
This makes no sense. With two exponential growing things, it is the one
with the larger exponent (time derivative of log of amount) that grows to
be biggest. If the exponents are the same the ratio between the two is
constant. So I ask again, why should the first colonizer have the biggest
exponent? And ordinary economic growth is (at least) exponetial, so why
doesn't this argument apply to that?
As Nick points out, technological innovation may not run out, so those who
stay closer to the center of innovation, and then expand later may grow
faster, by using more advanced technology.
>> If at least one of the largest expanding powers were "open", allowing us
>> all to buy shares in it, or to immigrate into it, then there is little risk
>> that the universe will be shut off from us.
>
>It is not clear why such a power would allow us to do this.
For the same reason that the U.S. should allow immigrants and foreign
investors; because they help us grow faster.
Robin Hanson
>From: Extropians@extropy.org
Reply-To: extropians@extropy.org
To: Extropians@extropy.org
Message-Id: <199309030404.AA07371@news.panix.com>
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 1993 00:04:44 -0400
Subject: Extropians Digest
X-Extropian-Date: September 3, 373 P.N.O. [04:04:37 UTC]
Errors-To: Extropians-Request@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Extropians Digest Fri, 3 Sep 93 Volume 93 : Issue 245
Date: Thu, 2 Sep 93 18:24:19 BST
From: Mark Grant
Subject: WAR/NANO/LAW: Against Nanarchy
>From: Extropians@extropy.org
Reply-To: extropians@extropy.org
To: Extropians@extropy.org
Message-Id: <199309031744.AA21978@news.panix.com>
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 1993 13:44:05 -0400
Subject: Extropians Digest
X-Extropian-Date: September 3, 373 P.N.O. [17:43:44 UTC]
Errors-To: Extropians-Request@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Extropians Digest Fri, 3 Sep 93 Volume 93 : Issue 245
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 2 Sep 93 22:46:06 PDT
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Subject: WAR/NANO/LAW: Against Nanarchy
From: drexler@netcom.com (K. Eric Drexler)
To: extropians@extropy.org
Cc: hanson@ptolemy.arc.nasa.gov, mmiller@netcom.com
Message-Id: <9309030615.AA08148@netcom.netcom.com>
Date: Thu, 2 Sep 93 23:15:10 -0700
Subject: Re: WAR/NANO/LAW, "nanarchy"
X-Mailer: AMiX Modified Eudora 1.3 Beta
>From: drexler@netcom.com (K. Eric Drexler)
To: extropians@extropy.org
Cc: hanson@ptolemy.arc.nasa.gov, mmiller@netcom.com
Message-Id: <9309030642.AA10835@netcom.netcom.com>
Date: Thu, 2 Sep 93 23:42:13 -0700
Subject: Re: WAR/NANO/LAW -- oops!
X-Mailer: AMiX Modified Eudora 1.3 Beta
From: Robin Hanson
To: extropians@extropy.org
Cc: hanson, mmiller@netcom.com, drexler@netcom.com
Message-Id: <9309032017.AA13709@ptolemy.arc.nasa.gov>
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 93 13:17:29 PDT
Subject: WAR/NANO/LAW: "nanarchy" and war
In-Reply-To: <9309030615.AA08148@netcom.netcom.com>
I'm not sure Eric Drexler and Mark Miller are worried about the same
problems, or envisioning the same answer. So I will try to let Eric's
comments stand on their own.
Eric says
I've spent much of the last ten years trying to explain simple
molecular machines, to provide a basis for understanding just how large
the coming jump in technology will be.
and as a result he worries about
a rather abrupt transition to a world with molecular manufacturing and
machine intelligence, ... imagine a history in which the Industrial
Revolution had faster payoffs: in which Britain had built aircraft
carriers and a substantial nuclear arsenal (and so forth) before other
nations managed to build a steam locomotive. ... a political entity or
coalition will achieve unilateral military dominance ... If machine
intelligence systems can perform a million years of R&D per calendar year
(and it seems they can), then it may well be that a good understanding
of the limits of military technology can be developed rather quickly.
That is, within a few years (months?), joe ordinary nation has started
nanotech, developed AIs which do R&D a million times faster than us,
built an overwhelming military force, taken over the world, and reached
the end of (military) technological innovation for all time. All while
the other guys are still in committee. Then,
some political entity will (for a time) be able to dominate the world,
and will be terrified of the consequences of not doing so, because of the
risks associated with an arms race arising in a more symmetrical situation
... [given] a technology so different from today's that past military
experience provides no basis for predicting the stability of a
multilateral competition. ... [It may ask itself] With this (absolutely
corrupting) power in hand, how can that political entity or coalition
relinquish its power safely? ... without turning it over to potential
enemies.
Fortunately,
technological means emerge for projecting military and police power
with highly automated systems ... [using] entities far more stable and
predictable than human beings and able to think orders of magnitude
faster ... [which can] provide a stable framework for security (in a
military sense and perhaps a police sense). ... vastly less intrusive
than modern governments ... attempt to build those [basic] principles
into the system and then throw away the key. ... for example,
suppressing the transfer of resources by forcible seizure
Where to start? First let me say that I can certainly imagine treaties
between suspicious military powers which are enforced in part by
automated systems, and that a single military power with internal
divisions might use similar techniques. Specifically, I can imagine a
course-grain automated monitoring system, broadcasting the situation at
many militarily strategic points to many military powers (or
distrusting internal organizations). This would require enough
monitoring sites to detect large scale military movements, but not
enough to see who stepped on your geraniums.
Even here I find it hard to imagine throwing away the key, though I
could see requiring a high degree of unanimity to make changes. I
could also see automated systems to manage certain defensive functions,
such as to shoot anything that crosses a certain "no mans land". But
before I'd even want to think about a permanent very fine grain system
to not just monitor, or even punish, but prevent most forms of
coercion, I'd want to have seen lots of experience with smaller scale
systems, gradually taking on more and more responsibility. You know,
like automated fences that know when to let you escape a burning house
and that don't try to shoot flood waters.
I too am concerned about the prospect of a single military power;
Hitler got too close for comfort. But I don't understand why, in a
nanotech era, a single power should be so much more terrified of
breaking up into multilateral competition than they would be now.
And I have great problems swallowing Eric's extreme sudden transition
scenario. I have tried to keep up with nanotech issues for many years,
and greatly admire Eric's efforts to elaborate a plausible and detailed
image of how advanced nanotechnology could work. But the publicly
visible efforts by Eric and the Foresight Institute have largely
ignored key policy issues like estimating the speed or scope of a
nanotech transition. I recall no analyses, offered for critical public
scrutiny, which suggest such an extreme transition.
If I were to guess, I'd say Eric thinks that soon after replicators one
could easily create many cubic meters of nanocomputers, and that within
a few years such computers would naturally become advanced AIs, who
could then build cubic kilometers of nanocomputers, and then the game
is up. I think that AI (and even huge nanocomputers) is much harder
than this, and therefore expect uploading well before AIs, slower more
incremental growth of nanotech economies and armies, and that there may
never be other things that think millions of times faster than uploads.
Eric asks "just what terribly-wrong outcome should we fear?". As I
said before, I fear a system trying to prevent too many useful actions
it could not tell from potential coercion, it costing too much and
looking too ugly, it preventing us from using more familiar punishments
to deter types of coercion the system doesn't cover, and most of all
the system being taken over by despots.
Eric "would encourage Robin to present ideas for addressing issues of
short-term and long-term military stability". I focus on imagining the
folks in some region trying to contract for defense services, and
looking for good indicators that the folks they contract with won't
enslave them or roll over should someone try to invade. My best idea
there is for them to look at betting markets on this question, where
the market speculators are in distant places and so are not threatened
by a bad local outcome. This is not much help, though, if a single
military power is the clear global military equilibrium.
Robin Hanson
P.S. I simply don't accept the premise that "constitutional and legal
systems are, ideally, impersonal systems of rules and enforcement
mechanisms" and therefore ideally would not "depend on the decisions
(or whims) of persons".
From: Extropians@extropy.org
Reply-To: extropians@extropy.org
To: Extropians@extropy.org
Message-Id: <199309070804.AA24416@news.panix.com>
Date: Tue, 7 Sep 1993 04:04:03 -0400
Subject: Extropians Digest
X-Extropian-Date: September 7, 373 P.N.O. [08:03:48 UTC]
Errors-To: Extropians-Request@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Extropians Digest Tue, 7 Sep 93 Volume 93 : Issue 249
Date: Mon, 6 Sep 93 19:04:53 -0700
From: drexler@netcom.com (K. Eric Drexler)
Subject: WAR/NANO/LAW, constraints and crime
In response to Robin's proposal:
Eric Drexler
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 6 Sep 93 19:05:08 -0700
From: drexler@netcom.com (K. Eric Drexler)
Subject: WAR/NANO/LAW: automated defense and war
Eric Drexler
From: drexler@netcom.com (K. Eric Drexler)
To: extropians@extropy.org, Robin Hanson
Cc: mmiller@netcom.com, hanson@ptolemy.arc.nasa.gov
Message-Id: <9309070204.AA29794@netcom.netcom.com>
Date: Mon, 6 Sep 93 19:04:53 -0700
Subject: Re: WAR/NANO/LAW, constraints and crime
X-Mailer: AMiX Modified Eudora 1.3 Beta
From: Extropians@extropy.org
Reply-To: extropians@extropy.org
To: Extropians@extropy.org
Message-Id: <199309061104.AA01253@news.panix.com>
Date: Mon, 6 Sep 1993 07:04:49 -0400
Subject: Extropians Digest
X-Extropian-Date: September 6, 373 P.N.O. [11:04:43 UTC]
Errors-To: Extropians-Request@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Extropians Digest Mon, 6 Sep 93 Volume 93 : Issue 248
------------------------------
Date: Saturday, 4 September 1993 08:38:42 PST8
From: "James A. Donald"
Subject: WAR/NANO/LAW, "nanarchy"
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 4 Sep 93 17:59:54 WET DST
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Subject: WAR/NANO/LAW, "nanarchy"
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 4 Sep 93 23:58:44 WET DST
From: smo@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Shawn O'Connor)
Subject: WAR/NANO/LAW: nanarchy
Shawn
smo@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 1993 20:24:27 -0500
From: "Phil G. Fraering"
Subject: WAR/NANO/LAW -- oops!
From: drexler@netcom.com (K. Eric Drexler)
To: extropians@extropy.org, Robin Hanson
Cc: hanson@ptolemy.arc.nasa.gov, mmiller@netcom.com
Message-Id: <9309070205.AA29831@netcom.netcom.com>
Date: Mon, 6 Sep 93 19:05:08 -0700
Subject: Re: WAR/NANO/LAW: automated defense and war
X-Mailer: AMiX Modified Eudora 1.3 Beta
These paragraphs are highly edited and rearranged. Don't quote them as mine!
Eric Drexler
From: Extropians@extropy.org
Reply-To: extropians@extropy.org
To: Extropians@extropy.org
Message-Id: <199309071407.AA00514@news.panix.com>
Date: Tue, 7 Sep 1993 10:07:53 -0400
Subject: Extropians Digest
X-Extropian-Date: September 7, 373 P.N.O. [14:07:45 UTC]
Errors-To: Extropians-Request@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Extropians Digest Tue, 7 Sep 93 Volume 93 : Issue 249
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 6 Sep 93 23:45:48 -0700
From: jamie@netcom.com (Jamie Dinkelacker)
Subject: WAR/NANO/LAW: Present tense / future imperfect
...............................
Jamie Dinkelacker, Palo Alto CA
Jamie@netcom.com | 415.941.4782
Date: Tue, 7 Sep 93 2:52:25 PDT
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Subject: NANO: Transition speed & political control
Nick Szabo szabo@netcom.com
From: Robin Hanson
To: extropians@extropy.org
Cc: drexler@netcom.com (K. Eric Drexler), hanson, mmiller@netcom.com
Message-Id: <9309082155.AA14631@ptolemy.arc.nasa.gov>
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 93 14:55:22 PDT
Subject: Re: WAR/NANO/LAW: automated defense and war
In-Reply-To: <9309070205.AA29831@netcom.netcom.com>
[Happens every time -- I start some big discussion and then I lose my
net access for several days. Oh well, I prefer a thoughtful pacing
between posts to the usual rapid-fire mode anyway. Robin
P.S. Cc me directly if you want to be sure I see something.]
Responding to my fears regarding a fine-grain throw-away-the-key "automated
defense" (was called "nanarchy"), Eric Drexler says those bad things would
be caused by "bad design", which could be overcome if we "have over 10**21
brainpower to apply to the problem (see above), and that we have some
ability to get that brainpower to pursue complex ends, perhaps by applying
agoric-style market incentives in a competitive context."
Far be it from me to tell a 10^21+ brainpower civilization, with a central
power carefully seeking guarantees of eternal peace after technological
innovation has mostly run out, how to run their politics and military.
They may indeed decide to follow Mark's and Eric's suggestions. The
question is, of course, what this observation could possibly have to do
with us now.
One connection for Mark Miller seemed to be that he feared a single entity
would own the universe unless such a system was in place before the first
interstellar colonization. Thus, I'm guessing, he thinks we now should
start pushing for such a solution before it's too late. I've already said
I don't see why a single universe owner is a natural result.
What is the connection for Eric? If a single super-duper power happens,
and it studies some issue very carefully, and finds a solution it likes, it
will do it, regardless of what we gnats thought about it now, right?
"When I briefed a room full of flag and staff officers at the Pentagon
last year, there was visible agreement ... to prevent the emergence of
the technology outside the leading coalition."
My guess is that Eric hopes that if we now encourage a single "good guy"
power to quickly dominate nanotech, we can avoid potentially nasty military
confrontations and move quickly to the ideal super-civilization which can
then implement this ideal automated defense. And if we make vivid this
future ideal to current leaders and voters in the single power,
social/political change will be slow enough that future leaders and voters
will still want this ideal by the time they are in a position to try to
implement it.
If this is what is at stake, then the issues become:
- How inevitable is a single power?
- How likely is a single power to break up from internal divisions?
- How bad would nanotech multilateral competition be?
- How corrupt could a single power become in becoming a super-duper power?
- How feasible is a fine-grain permanent automated defense anyway?
I remain skeptical, but open-minded, on all these issues.
How inevitable is "a massive imbalance of power favoring a single
coalition"? Eric's "basic argument for a fast military transition ...
rests instead on the ability of molecular manufacturing systems to make
hardware that is far superior (often by one or more orders of magnitude)
and far cheaper (typically by several orders of magnitude) than military
hardware is today." Clearly if one side can make wide use of nanotech, and
the other's can't, then the nanotech side wins. But why wouldn't all sides
have some nanotech, with some further ahead in some areas than others?
Eric seems to argue that nanotech will have little value before
self-replicating systems (contrary to Nick's scenario), but can quickly
mushroom afterward within the scope of a single military power. This is
because "the sheer speed of experimentation possible with fast
manufacturing processes" and "computer aided design techniques, which will
enable designs to precede tool development" and to "translate preexisting
designs into moderately-better, much-cheaper forms". That is, we'll have
the software all ready, just waiting for the hardware to run it.
This argument simply needs a lot more fleshing out before it can be
persuasive to me. And to the extent it is right, and to the extent we fear
a single power, it argues for stopping all this nanotech design-ahead!
If some factors of the process of making new products speed up, others will
become the limiting factor. In order for the whole process to go ten times
faster, most of the main process tasks must go a similar factor faster.
Making new products, even new military products, requires not just
manufacturing and compilation of higher level designs. Products must be
conceived and sold to investors/managers. Design teams must be collected
and learn to work together. Prototypes must not only be made but tested in
a variety of contexts. Customers must learn of the product and figure out
how to put it to use. Raw materials must be imported and final products
transported out. Legal and political barriers must be overcome.
Why should we fear multilateral competition? Because "the consequences of
these technologies for military strategy and tactics are unpredictable" and
"multiple basic technologies ... have recently advanced by
orders of magnitude, in which weapon system performance and emergent
opportunities for strategic surprise are radically different, and in which
weapon production can be orders of magnitude faster than today. Novel
self-replicating systems are possible, including self-replicating weapons.
Machine intelligence and/or uploaded human minds may take the field as
strategic actors"
Yes, yes, technological change will get faster. So why should this make
war so much more likely or more devastating relative to the economy? Yes,
"nuclear arms race had people a little nervous", but most technologies are
not like A-bombs, which have little non-military use. Should folks have
feared multilateral competition during the industrial revolution?
If social change speds up along with technological change, then even very
rapid change and growth need not be militarily destabilizing. The issue
must be the relative rates of these changes. And most social change, like
divorce rates or clothing styles, can remain slow, as long as
military/political leaders are fast enough in adjusting their alliances and
defenses to expectations of relative military power.
Regarding the pace of social/political change, it seems that Eric is
willing to invoke fast uploads or powerful AIs to produce great
technological change in a few calendar years, yet sees these actors as
largely outside the political process. He says, "To model the thinking of
voters, politicians, etc., one cannot take the perspective of the uploads."
Yet I imagine fast uploads becoming the center of events, holding much of
the wealth and almost all the political/military positions, with slow
meatheads as marginalized as bobbled folk in Vinge's Peace Wars.
>From the point of view of uploads, it could take a very long time before
technological innovation runs out; many winds of political fashion could
come and go, and many alliances could change and powers rise and fall. And
relative to uploads, automated defenses might be too slow and dumb to be
relied on very heavily.
Jamie and Nick both offered thoughtful posts, and both seemed to expect a
more gradual transition. Does anyone else out there find Eric's rapid
transition more plausible?
Robin Hanson
From: Extropians@extropy.org
Reply-To: extropians@extropy.org
To: Extropians@extropy.org
Message-Id: <199309090407.AA13068@news.panix.com>
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 1993 00:07:24 -0400
Subject: Extropians Digest
X-Extropian-Date: September 9, 373 P.N.O. [04:06:40 UTC]
Errors-To: Extropians-Request@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Extropians Digest Thu, 9 Sep 93 Volume 93 : Issue 251
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 93 14:36:01 PDT
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Subject: POLI:gossip & privacy
Nick Szabo szabo@netcom.com
From: Extropians@extropy.org
Reply-To: extropians@extropy.org
To: Extropians@extropy.org
Message-Id: <199309091108.AA20045@news.panix.com>
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 1993 07:08:23 -0400
Subject: Extropians Digest
X-Extropian-Date: September 9, 373 P.N.O. [11:08:07 UTC]
Errors-To: Extropians-Request@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Extropians Digest Thu, 9 Sep 93 Volume 93 : Issue 251
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 93 19:18:01 PDT
From: peb@procase.com (Paul Baclace)
Subject: WAR/NANO/LAW: automated defense and war
Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com
From: Robin Hanson
To: extropians@extropy.org
Cc: hanson, peb@procase.com
Message-Id: <9309092134.AA22730@ptolemy.arc.nasa.gov>
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 93 14:34:23 PDT
Subject: WAR/NANO/LAW: automated defense and war
In-Reply-To: <199309091108.AA20045@news.panix.com>
Paul Baclace writes:
>dD/dO { delta Defensive weapon cost / delta Offensive weapon cost }
>seems to be assumed in previous postings as favoring cheap offensive
>weapons. This seems typical in that it is easier to destroy than to build,
>but considering that molecular objects will more and more take on the
>characteristics of data, this may change: cryptography, replication,
>error correcting memory, capability systems, offsite backup, redundancy,
>etc. all could be defensive technologies that would be challenging to
>an offensive gray goo.
I don't recall the previous postings mentioned, but while I've worried
publicly on this list about offense being cheaper in near-space war, I
don't see any particular reason to expect nanotech to favor offense
over defense. This is one of the reasons I don't see why I should be
so worried about military consequences of nanotech.
Robin Hanson
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
To: extropians@extropy.org, hanson@ptolemy.arc.nasa.gov
Message-Id: <9309092150.AA09634@banff.procase.com>
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 93 14:50:55 PDT
Subject: Re: WAR/NANO/LAW: automated defense and war
From: Extropians@extropy.org
Reply-To: extropians@extropy.org
To: Extropians@extropy.org
Message-Id: <199309161741.AA02628@news.panix.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 1993 13:41:47 -0400
Subject: Extropians Digest
X-Extropian-Date: September 16, 373 P.N.O. [17:40:37 UTC]
Errors-To: Extropians-Request@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Extropians Digest Thu, 16 Sep 93 Volume 93 : Issue 258
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 93 08:33:37 GMT
From: Michael Clive Price
Subject: POLL: Singularity speed
Mike Price price@price.demon.co.uk
>From hanson Wed Feb 2 12:21:16 1994
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From: hanson (Robin Hanson)
To: hanson
Message-Id: <9402022021.AA00256@hss.caltech.edu>
Date: Wed, 2 Feb 94 12:21:15 PST
Subject: fnerd on nanarchy
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Mon, 31 Jan 94 18:55:46 EST
Subject: [#94-1-749] PHIL/POL/TECH: nanarchy
Mike Price says-
> We had quite a discussion on nanarchy a while back. Folks were pretty
> dismissive of it, by and large, for both moral and practical reasons.
> ... :-) [not sure of the scope of this smiley -fnerd]
Although blue goo gives me the creeps, I find it hard to dismiss the
argument that it's the only alternative (anyone has thought of) to
something much worse--some one person or small group taking over
everything.
I remember arguments (not just dismissals)...care to summarize them,
Mike?
-fnerd
quote me
From: hanson (Robin Hanson)
To: Extropians@extropy.org
Cc: hanson
Message-Id: <9402022035.AA00316@hss.caltech.edu>
Date: Wed, 2 Feb 94 12:35:35 PST
Subject: [#94-1-749] PHIL/POL/TECH: nanarchy
Mike Price said:
> We had quite a discussion on nanarchy a while back. Folks were pretty
> dismissive of it, by and large, for both moral and practical reasons.
> ... :-) [not sure of the scope of this smiley -fnerd]
Fnerd responded:
>Although blue goo gives me the creeps, I find it hard to dismiss the
>argument that it's the only alternative (anyone has thought of) to
>something much worse--some one person or small group taking over
>everything.
>
>I remember arguments (not just dismissals)...care to summarize them,
Perhaps Fnerd should first summarize the argument(s) why one person or
a small group would take over without blue goo.
Robin Hanson
P.S. The Extropy issue currently in your mailbox gives selections from
our last big discussion.
From: hanson (Robin Hanson)
To: hanson
Message-Id: <9402032047.AA06092@hss.caltech.edu>
Date: Thu, 3 Feb 94 12:47:44 PST
Subject: price on nanarchy
------------------------------
From: price@price.demon.co.uk (Michael Clive Price)
Date: Tue, 01 Feb 94 08:14:35 GMT
Subject: [#94-2-3] PHIL/POL/TECH: nanarchy
Mike Price price@price.demon.co.uk
AnarchyPPL client
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Thu, 3 Feb 94 01:08:09 EST
Subject: [#94-2-33] [#94-1-749] PHIL/POL/TECH: nanarchy
> Perhaps Fnerd should first summarize the argument(s) why one person or
> a small group would take over without blue goo.
>
> Robin Hanson
The way I remember my model of the situation when last I lost interest
is, you have an approx. expanding sphere. Different territories are
expanding outward "along" this 2D boundary. They expand at slightly
different rates. Factor out the overall expansion and the borders
are shifting along the surface of the sphere. The closer the rate
of expansion to the speed of light, the less oportunity to come
up with new methods, but if someone starts out with a slightly
better method and tradeoff of expansion/defense/research/
exploiting-territory, then their patch on the sphere surface just
slowly expands till it's the whole surface, at which point everyone
else is enclosed.
So I'm focusing on the pure physical idea of grey-goo wars, here,
not getting into why somebody might want to start (their side of)
one. I don't necessarily think it will happen or that blue goo
is a defense.
> P.S. The Extropy issue currently in your mailbox gives selections from
> our last big discussion.
I think Somerville is in the Slow Zone.
-fnerd
quote me
oh no others are getting things faster than meeeeeee
- -
cryptocosmology- sufficiently advanced communication is indistinguishable
from noise - god is in the least significant bits
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From: price@price.demon.co.uk (Michael Clive Price)
Date: Sat, 05 Feb 94 05:42:06 GMT
Subject: [#94-2-58] PHIL/POL/TECH: nanarchy
Mike Price price@price.demon.co.uk
AnarchyPPL client
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Wed, 23 Feb 94 14:00:50 EST
Subject: [#94-2-237] Blue Goo Background
Reading the Extropy reprint of the debate on blue goo,
I noticed two things worth pointing out about where Drexler
and Miller (and Dean Tribble) are coming from.
I get this inside knowledge mostly from conversations with
MarkM going back a couple of years. I'm not sure where he,
Erik and Dean stand relative to what I remember or to each
other. I'm going to blur them together and call them
DM&T (alphabetically).
One idea is the idea of rule of law. Hayek, (or was it Mises?)
whom DM&T and many of us admire, was aparently big on this.
If you have a simple, fixed, impartially-enforced set of laws,
this is supposed to be better than rule by people, which
involves all sorts of bad feedbacks, corruption, Kafka made
odiously relevant, and interference in life.
Rule of law means people know where they stand, so they can
plan.
The other background idea is "biology vs. economy." What
DM&T mean by this is that in biology, you can
just eat your neighbor. Predation is a--almost the--way of
life. Protection against it is up to each individual. In
a "true" economy, however, protection of lives and property
is taken care of by a specialized agency, and the normal
activity of people is voluntary, value-for-value trading.
This means that much more effort is going into productive
work (and once again, planning is possible) instead of the
"war of all against all."
DM&T collaborated on some chapters on "agoric" systems in a
cool book called "The Ecology of Computation."
In designing systems where little software agents
compete and evolve to provide computing and information
services, it's important to set up a base that guarantees
"economic" instead of "biological" competition (Lenat's
Eurisko, eg, suffers from constant corruption of its priority
mechanism, because heuristics keep evolving to exploit
loopholes and give themselves priority rather than do
useful work--because he didn't forsee the need to make
Eurisko "economic.")
These related ideas--rule of law, and that economic life
needs a (prior) basis of protection against predation--
are pretty basic to libertarianism.
So maybe this is a chance for us anarchists and polyarchists
to look at whether and how we depart from libertarianism,
and if so, what principles to offer as alternatives.
My idea of good ~government~ is that the definitions of rights
and property have always been somewhat market-determined and
-adjusted, and their defense user-initiated and -funded, and
they should continue to be.
-fnerd
quote me
From: timstarr@netcom.com (Tim Starr)
Date: Thu, 24 Feb 1994 02:04:00 -0800
Subject: [#94-2-253] Blue Goo Background
Tim Starr - Renaissance Now!
Assistant Editor: Freedom Network News, the newsletter of ISIL,
The International Society for Individual Liberty,
1800 Market St., San Francisco, CA 94102
(415) 864-0952; FAX: (415) 864-7506; 71034.2711@compuserve.com
Think Universally, Act Selfishly - timstarr@netcom.com
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Thu, 24 Feb 94 17:32:11 EST
Subject: [#94-2-259] Blue Goo Background
i wrote-
> >In
> >a "true" economy, however, protection of lives and property
> >is taken care of by a specialized agency,
Tim Starr replied-
> Why? I've heard this assumption many times, but I've always thought
> it preferable to have this as decentralized as possible...
Hey, I'm an anarchist, too. That's why I put quotes around "true."
> As for the "nanarchy" idea, I think it's predicated on two improbabili-
> ties: 1) that it's possible for machines to replace people. I'm still
> more of an AI skeptic than ever, sorry, and if you don't like it then
> read Searle's latest book, take two aspirin, and argue with me in the
> morning; 2) That even if it were possible, that anyone would set up
> such a system in such a way that it would be immune to takeover by
> hostile programs which would be tempted to seize the power it would
> hold.
The idea is that the system enforces very simple rules. For instance,
it won't let someone's person or property (as it has it listed) be
touched by anyone else unless the owner engages in some protocol with
it. Likewise to transfer ownership. Also, it detects any attempts at
doing anything nearly powerful enough to overthrow it and destroys
them. Once it's set up, there is no more programming going on, so I
don't see how you get "hostile programs" into it.
-fnerd
From: timstarr@netcom.com (Tim Starr)
Date: Fri, 25 Feb 1994 22:24:53 -0800
Subject: [#94-2-288] Nanarchy
Tim Starr - Renaissance Now!
From: timstarr@netcom.com (Tim Starr)
Date: Mon, 28 Feb 1994 22:03:54 -0800
Subject: [#94-3-2] Nanarchy
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Mon, 28 Feb 94 16:51:23 EST
Subject: [#94-2-328] Nanarchy
fnerd:
> >> >In a "true" economy, however, protection of lives and property
> >> >is taken care of by a specialized agency,
Tim Starr:
> >> Why? I've heard this assumption many times, but I've always thought
> >> it preferable to have this as decentralized as possible...
fnerd:
> >Hey, I'm an anarchist, too. That's why I put quotes around "true."
Tim:
> There's more involved than just anarchy/minarchy. What I meant was to
> get at two different possible distributions of force in an anarchist
> society.
>
> One is the "professionalized" model, in which all force is exercised by
> specialists - security guards, arbitrators, case advisers, etc. The
> other is the "amateur" model, in which everyone is maximally armed and
> authorized to use force defensively, and specialists free-lance, only
> serving when called upon.
I don't know what I think is the "natural" way of things.
Maybe mostly do-it-yourself protection. Maybe insurance companies with
lots of free-lance enforcers, or enforcement like "lost dog" posters.
Maybe some centralization.
> The former seems to be what Rothbard and various other theorists have in
> mind, and has been the main subject of attack by statists. The problem
> with it is that all the pros have to do is start initiating force instead
> of using it defensively, and they become a State.
They at least have to overthrow their competitors and their clients
(revenue source). I'm not sure this is a real threat. I think the tendency
toward monopoly we're used to seeing is due to the state we already have.
> >The idea is that the system enforces very simple rules. For instance,
> >it won't let someone's person or property (as it has it listed) be
> >touched by anyone else unless the owner engages in some protocol with
> >it. Likewise to transfer ownership.
>
> This is the part that relies on good AIs.
I don't think this needs AI if the blue goo works by eating everything
and simulating it (clear blue goo? blue goo sea?). I think you're right,
it's real tough if it has to watch from somewhere (where?) outside.
> If there's non-coercive stuff to be done which would have the potential
> to take over the system, then the system wouldn't be able to do anything
> about it without coercion, which would presumably be against its program-
> ming. Why wouldn't there be such stuff? That's the way it is now with
> present tech. Tanks are little more than bulldozers with armor shells
> and guns, for example.
? Tampering with the system is coercion by (the system's) definition.
So I don't get your question. If you construct anything like the tools
you would need to tamper with the goo, the near-tools are destroyed.
Either that or the components you would need just aren't available
in the blue sea.
-fnerd
quote me
From: sjw@liberty.demon.co.uk (Stephen J. Whitrow)
Date: Tue, 01 Mar 94 02:41:59 GMT
Subject: [#94-2-334] Nanarchy, no thanks! - Cryonarchy, maybe
[This post includes some thoughts on nanarchy, basement universes, and
anarchist transitional strategies.]
Tim Starr replies to Steve Witham:
>There's more involved than just anarchy/minarchy. What I meant was to
>get at two different possible distributions of force in an anarchist
>society.
>
>One is the "professionalized" model, in which all force is exercised by
>specialists - security guards, arbitrators, case advisers, etc. The
>other is the "amateur" model, in which everyone is maximally armed and
>authorized to use force defensively, and specialists free-lance, only
>serving when called upon.
I, too, prefer the "amateur" model. Give the specialists just enough
power so that ordinary people don't need to get too involved in serious
warfare, but not so much that the specialists can become a State.
Under nanarchy you have to hope that the AIs remain impervious to takeover,
and loyal to their creators rather than evolving their own programs, for
billions of years -- some hope! The system may offer the advantages of
covering some temporary, milder risks, but there remains the longterm risk
of such a "permanent solution" going terribly wrong. The ultimate horror
would be an indestructible State the size of the universe, with all other
lifeforms as slaves. If designed by anarchists, a supreme irony indeed.
Basement universes open up interesting possibilities. Universes could
become like the obsolete countries of today, and tomorrow's PPL space
settlements. Each would have their own set of laws, with some universes
designed to take the road to nanarchy, and the creators of others not
wishing to manufacture unnatural constraints as part of 'natural' law.
The despots of failed nanarchic universes would prefer to restrict
emigration. It's true that they could easily produce more slaves. And
if they kept regular backups of their more talented slaves then loss of
these individuals would only be tantamount to loss of skills acquired and
latest ideas for new products (for the ruling classes) conceived since the
last backup. Which I'd suspect would be less than that for the citizens
of a free universe in the same time period, although backups would
probably be less regular under nanarchy. But after a period of growth,
innovation would become the sole source for generation of further wealth.
Most universes would be competing for immigrants, and the fresh ideas that
they would bring.
So it wouldn't matter so much to the rulers if slaves escaped into their
own child universes; however, prevention of this would be a simple matter
for the rulers. But they would be concerned with feedback to the parent
universe, and its effects on immigration. It would be no solution to
simply prevent everyone from leaving, that would immediately give the game
away. What would be necessary would be to send out "satisfied citizens"
at regular intervals (they are supposed to be happy after all, so most of
them could justifiably soon return). So the rulers would create copies
of individuals and tamper with their minds, brainwashing them with
propaganda about what a wonderful paradise it was. Just to be on the safe
side, the originals would probably be disposed of, to eliminate the
possibility of mix-ups. The regions around the wormhole would also be
filled with these phoney "citizens" to impress would-be immigrants.
Any outgoing radio transmissions from the far zones would be carefully
monitored. Those that failed to present the "true" picture would be
jammed by powerful transmitters near the entrance. Traversable wormholes
controlled by the rulers would allow them to send data on which broadcasts
to jam, this data arriving at the entrance before the broadcast had even
been transmitted, allowing ample advance time to zap the lightspeed
signals. Due to the rulers' use of arrays of basement universes, they
would also have no problem cracking public key encrypted messages, and
illegal use of pgp to send "counter-revolutionary propaganda" would merit
a penalty of torture, lasting a _long_ time!
A possible experiment, then, would be to create a large number of basement
universes, some anarchic and some nanarchic. Adjust the time dilation
such that their time is greatly speeded up with respect to our time, and
compare travellers from each type. If those from nanarchic universes
subtly exhibit peculiar behaviour, be even more cautious of nanarchy! And
if any slaves did successfully escape and spill the beans, the true
nanarchy failure rate would have to be estimated by allowing for the
proportion where the tyrants' schemes had worked.
So I don't think infecting our universe with nanoGorts is a good idea, and
if it's carried out before the time of mature wormholetech, there could
literally be no escape. If it's started at a later time at least those
outside the bubble will have escape routes, but it would be a pity if the
result was to turn "the meek shall inherit the earth" into "the meek shall
inherit the (parent) universe".
As a transitional strategy to be advocated by outreachers, I'd suggest
a system which might just qualify as anarcho-capitalism, but would also
appear something like the "libertarian socialism" of David Miller,
described in *Extropy* 11. Somehow the minarchy element has to be put
into a state of suspended animation, only given power if called back by
the people. Meanwhile there would be security specialists, arbitrators,
etc operating on a freelance basis. Funds from private charity would be
channelled into "negative income-tax" transfers for the genuinely poor.
If it takes 30-40% of GNP for a State to feed its gravy train, intervene
in thousands of areas where it does far more harm than good (e.g. the
Therapeutic State), and do a hopelessly inefficient job of arranging
redistribution and maintaining order, how much does it take to privately
help the poor and enforce PPL law -- 10%? 15%?
The aim would be an alliance between private citizens, intended to
eliminate all the disadvantages of governments yet at the same time
addressing the concerns of those who don't like the idea of being "left
to market forces". It would be pointed out that competing private
protection agencies would doubtless perform the job much better than a
monopolistic State provided service. Private charities would help the
needy more efficiently than would routing the money via the State. And
since a necessary feature of government is coercion, coercion requires
power, and power corrupts according to its extent, governments have a
momentum of their own. They aim to increase their power, and don't plan
on accepting limits suggested by mere citizens. Trying to limit a
government to carrying out a particular role is a little like attempting
to stop a nuclear explosion just after it's been detonated.
So the minarchy is put into cold storage with its members, probably former
State employees, paid a retainer. Additional funds are frozen, and
placed in the control of representatives of the proletariat, along with
the arms that would be used by enforcement agents of the minarchy. The
targets (funds privately raised, crime levels) would be negotiated in
advance between anarchists and the proles. If they aren't met (on, say,
two consecutive years) the minarchy is reactivated. Its powers are
limited but it would have to be able to enforce tax collection! After a
period the experiment is restarted. Ideally the targets would continue
to be met, the minarchy's potential power being gradually killed off.
The cryonarchy system might be voted in, or an existing regime might
collapse. Cryonarchy would address concerns of the left which anarcho-
capitalism would leave unresolved. In order to limit the minarchy's
power whenever it was called up, its funds and arsenal would be less than
that controlled by the people. When it had been demonstrated that only
statists benefit from statism, the minarchy's guns and money would be
distributed back to the people. The Renaissance would have arrived.
Steve Whitrow sjw@liberty.demon.co.uk
------------------------------
From: carlf@media.mit.edu (Carl Feynman)
Date: Tue, 1 Mar 1994 18:52:07 -0100
Subject: [#94-3-12] Blue Goo Background
--carlf
Internet: carlf@media.mit.edu Home phone: (508)635-9238
Office phone: (617)253-9833 Mail: 1 Gregory Ln., Acton MA 01720
Missile: 42d28'38"N 71d28'49"W +90m Holler: "Yo! Carl Feynman!"